Why so serious? Lachaux and the threshold of ‘serious harm’ in section 1 Defamation Act 2013 by Bennett, T.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Bennett, T. (2018). Why so serious? Lachaux and the threshold of ‘serious harm’ 
in section 1 Defamation Act 2013. Journal of Media Law, 10(1), pp. 1-16. doi: 
10.1080/17577632.2018.1446403 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/20420/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17577632.2018.1446403
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
[DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE] 
 
 
Why So Serious?  
Lachaux and the threshold of “serious harm” in section 1 Defamation Act 2013 
 
 
Thomas DC Bennett* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, the Court of Appeal has held that s.1 
Defamation Act 2013, which requires claimants in defamation cases to show 
that the offending statement has caused, or is likely to cause, serious 
reputational harm, was intended to “raise the bar” for claims above the standard 
previously demanded by the common law. However, despite finding that this 
was Parliament’s intention in enacting s.1, the Court then held that this intention 
had not actually been successfully implemented by the wording of the Act. As 
such, the Court of Appeal has determined that the tort of libel is today 
actionable per se.  
 
The notion that libel is a tort that is actionable per se is one that has a lengthy 
heritage in the English common law. However, an examination of case law 
between 2005 and the passing of the 2013 Act reveals that libel had ceased to be 
actionable per se long before the new s.1 appeared on the statute books. The 
Court of Appeal’s ruling in Lachaux is thus troubling. For the court based its 
ruling on a misunderstanding of the position that the common law had reached 
prior to the recent legislation. This misunderstanding led the Court to believe 
that interpreting s.1 as imposing a requirement that claimants adduce evidence 
of “serious harm” to their reputations amounted to a “radical” alteration of the 
common law, for which insufficient express indicia were to be found in the 
wording of the section. This has resulted in the Court failing to interpret the Act 
in a manner consistent with the Parliamentary intention that it has identified, 
thereby frustrating that very intention. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Is libel actionable per se, or not? That is the question at the heart of the case of 
Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd.
1
 Determining answers to that question led 
first the High Court and then the Court of Appeal to consider a number of 
related matters that lend both judgments a rather busy and, at times, disjointed 
feel. But at base the question is a relatively simple one concerning the 
interpretation of s.1 Defamation Act 2013 and the state of the common law 
pertaining to libel prior to the Act coming into force. 
 
The claimant, Bruno Lachaux, had brought a claim in libel against the 
defendants in respect of articles published in their newspapers and on their 
websites that contained allegations against him that he averred were defamatory 
of him. At the trial of preliminary issues in the claim – primarily the issue of the 
meaning of the articles – Warby J found these articles to be defamatory of 
Lachaux. The allegations were serious; the articles alleged (amongst other 
things) that he had been violent towards his estranged wife and that he had 
endeavoured to use the legal system of the United Arab Emirates to bring a false 
prosecution against his estranged wife in order to obtain custody of their son.  
 
The defendant appealed, arguing that Warby J had erred in law when holding 
that the articles were defamatory of the claimant. In particular, it was argued 
that the judge was wrong to find that the articles were “likely to cause serious 
harm” to the claimant’s reputation, as required by s.1 Defamation Act 2013.2 
The claimant responded by arguing that, whilst Warby J had reached the correct 
decision in law, he had done so by taking an overly circuitous route; the 
“serious harm” test in s.1 did not require, as the judge had thought, evidence 
that the chances of serious reputational harm being caused by the articles was 
“more likely than not”. 
 
The case is significant because it represents the first appellate treatment of s.1 
Defamation Act 2013 and because, whilst the result reached at first instance is 
upheld, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of s.1 differs considerably from that 
of the High Court. Most significantly, the High Court’s determination that libel 
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 Lachaux and AOL (UK) Ltd v Independent Print Ltd and Evening Standard Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1334 
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 Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides:  
1.— Serious harm (1) A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is 
likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. 
 
is “no longer actionable per se” is, in essence, rejected by the Court of Appeal. 
This rejection actually amounts to a reversal of the common law position prior 
to the Act. As such, libel has in fact reverted to being a tort that is actionable 
per se, something that it has not been accurate – either practically or formally – 
to describe libel as since 2005. This conclusion, and the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning in reaching it, is problematic. 
 
THE HIGH COURT JUDGMENT 
 
In order for a statement to be defamatory it must, according to s.1 Defamation 
Act 2013, cause or be likely to cause “serious harm” to the claimant’s 
reputation. This, Warby J held, requires claimants to adduce evidence 
demonstrating either that “serious harm” has occurred, or that it is more likely 
than not to occur. Other than in circumstances where the meaning of the words 
complained-of is so serious that serious reputational harm is inevitable and can 
thus be inferred (for example, if the words purport to identify an individual as 
involved in a conspiracy to murder or committing a serious sexual crime), 
extrinsic evidence will need to be adduced in order to satisfy s.1. Whereas under 
the common law prior to the Act inferences as to the seriousness of the 
allegations could routinely be drawn simply from the offending words 
themselves, after the Act’s coming into force extrinsic evidence will normally 
be required. 
 
In the event, Warby J found sufficient evidence of a likelihood that serious harm 
would occur to the claimant’s reputation to satisfy s.1. As such, his conclusion 
and that of the Court of Appeal – that the claimant had a valid claim for libel – 
are aligned. But Warby J’s finding that libel is not – as it had long been thought 
to be at common law – actionable per se caused consternation on appeal. This 
was because, in the Court of Appeal’s eyes, this signalled a significant and 
apparently radical shift in the law. Moreover, Warby J’s conclusion takes on a 
controversial appearance because there is no explicit mention in section 1 itself 
of an intention to alter the long-standing view that libel is actionable per se. If it 
was what Parliament intended, the statute is poorly drafted. For that intention 
appears – at best – obliquely and ambiguously in the text of s.1. 
 
THE COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT 
 
There is no disagreement between the Court of Appeal and the High Court in 
respect of the proper disposal of the case. However, the Court of Appeal rejects 
the notion that libel is no longer actionable per se. It denies that claimants must 
now ordinarily adduce extrinsic evidence of actual damage in order to show that 
words complained-of are “likely to cause” serious reputational harm; inferences 
of a likelihood of serious harm may continue – as before – to be drawn from the 
words themselves, and not just in the most extreme cases. Thus, whilst the 
Court of Appeal upholds Warby J’s first instance decision in terms of result, it 
departs significantly from his reasoning (and, in effect, reverses his 
interpretation of s.1).
3
 
 
There are two matters in the Court of Appeal’s judgment upon which further 
comment is warranted. These are: first, the question of what Parliament had 
intended in passing s.1, and, second, the coherence of its interpretation of s.1 
with the common law on the issue of whether libel claimants must prove some 
degree of reputational damage in order to found a valid claim. We will 
scrutinise each of these matters in turn. Before we do so, however, it is 
necessary to consider the state of the common law prior to the Act’s 
introduction. 
 
THE COMMON LAW PRIOR TO THE DEFAMATION ACT 2013 
 
In the High Court, Warby J had considered the state of the common law prior to 
the coming into force of s.1. In his view, two developments at common law had 
altered significantly the view – previously widely held – that libel was 
actionable without proof of loss or damage. These developments occurred in the 
cases of Jameel
4
 and Thornton.
5
 
 
In Jameel, the Court of Appeal had struck out, as an abuse of process, a claim 
that disclosed no substantial tort in this jurisdiction. This was because although 
the claimant had suffered some reputational damage in England, publication of 
the offending words had been to a very small number of people and the extent 
of damages he could expect to receive by way of vindication would have been 
                                                          
3
 As a result, the Court of Appeal’s decision also reverses the interpretation of s.1 in two other earlier High 
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 Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co. Inc. [2005] EWCA Civ 75, [2005] QB 946. 
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 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Limited [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB), [2011] 1 WLR 1985. 
“out of all proportion” to the cost of the litigation.6 Permitting a claim to 
proceed in these circumstances would risk violating the defendant’s Article 10 
ECHR right to freedom of expression. 
 
In Thornton, Tugendhat J held that a range of earlier cases – including some of 
the classic, seminal cases in defamation, and also the Jameel case – indicated, 
when read together, that the common law imposed a threshold requirement of 
“seriousness” that had the effect of barring trivial claims. According to 
Tugendhat J, the common law definition of what amounts to a “defamatory” 
statement “should be varied so as to include a threshold of seriousness.”7 This, 
he suggested, could be accomplished by adding some words to the classic 
definition as formulated by Neill LJ in Berkoff v Burchill.
8
 Tugendhat J’s 
revised wording thus read: “the publication of which [the claimant] complains 
may be defamatory of him because it substantially affects in an adverse manner 
the attitude of other people towards him, or has a tendency so to do.”9 He 
preferred the term “attitude” to “estimation” because it  
 
makes clear that it is the actions of the right-thinking persons that 
must be likely to be affected (so that they treat the claimant 
unfavourably, or less favourably than they would otherwise have 
done), not just their thoughts or opinions.
10
 
 
For Tugendhat J, then, the addition of the phrase “or has a tendency to do so” 
encapsulated the common law’s seriousness threshold. He finds this to be 
compatible with the long-standing presumption of damage in defamation cases 
(something with which Warby J agrees) and, indeed, to support that 
presumption: 
 
If the likelihood of adverse consequences for a claimant is part of 
the definition of what is defamatory, then the presumption of 
damage is the logical corollary of what is already included in the 
definition. And conversely, the fact that in law damage is presumed 
                                                          
6
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7
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8
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 Thornton, (n 5) [92]. 
is itself an argument why an imputation should not be held to be 
defamatory unless it has a tendency to have adverse effects upon 
the claimant. It is difficult to justify why there should be a 
presumption of damage if words can be defamatory while having 
no likely adverse consequence for the claimant.
11
 
 
Thus, for Tugendhat J, by the time Thornton came to be decided, the common 
law had already imposed a requirement that the claimant should show – whether 
by adducing evidence or by way of inference drawn from the severity of the 
offending words – a likelihood that she would suffer adverse consequences in 
the form of less favourable treatment at the hands of right-thinking others. An 
inability to show such a likelihood would render the claim a trivial one; it would 
fail to pass the seriousness hurdle (and would thus not be actionable). This was 
deemed to be just because only those claims that could demonstrate sufficient 
seriousness – by way of showing such a likelihood – were properly deserving of 
the presumption of damage that automatically comes with an actionable claim 
in libel. In other words, libel was no longer actionable without some proof of 
loss or damage. This “proof” might be provided by inferences drawn from the 
severity of the words used, for example, and the loss or damage contemplated 
need only amount to a likelihood of less favourable treatment at the hands of 
others. Nevertheless, the tort of libel no longer seemed to be actionable per se in 
a technical sense. 
 
In Lachaux, the Court of Appeal suggests that there is a relevant distinction 
between Jameel and Thornton that means that the two cases do not actually 
prevent libel from (still) being actionable per se. The distinction is that, whilst 
Thornton concerns the question of whether or not the claim is actionable in the 
first place, Jameel is concerned only with whether a claim that has already been 
found to be actionable amounts to a real and substantial tort.
12
  
 
This distinction, however, is less significant than the Court of Appeal would 
have us believe. Jameel, it must be recalled, was decided five years before 
Thornton. At the time, the question whether the statement was defamatory (that 
is, whether the claim was actionable) was thought to be distinct from the 
question of whether or not a substantial tort had been committed. But the effect 
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 It might also be argued that Jameel is limited to cases in which jurisdiction is a live issue. For the reasons 
explored in the remainder of this short section, that argument does not seem persuasive. 
of the Thornton ruling is to require some proof of damage in order to 
demonstrate that the offending statement is defamatory – that the claim is 
actionable in the first place. Jameel might be thought of as having set the scene 
for Thornton, in particular by setting out clearly the potential for an interference 
with Article 10 posed by a libel claim in which there was no evidence that 
substantial harm had been suffered. But Thornton had – prior to the Defamation 
Act 2013 and the Lachaux litigation – entirely encapsulated the salient 
requirements imposed on claimants by the common law. Jameel, whilst a 
supportive authority, was no longer a necessary component of the argument that 
libel was no longer actionable per se. 
 
Nevertheless, the notion, adopted by the Court of Appeal in Lachaux, that libel 
had remained (and does remain) actionable per se is one that has persisted, 
notwithstanding the Thornton and Jameel rulings. It is well-rehearsed 
academically and it has long-standing precedential weight behind it. As 
Goddard LJ put it in the Odhams Press case: 
 
A plaintiff can, if he likes, by way of aggravating damages, show 
that he has suffered actual damage, which he can prove, but in 
every case he is perfectly entitled to say ‘Here is a serious libel on 
me. The law assumes I must have suffered damage and I am 
perfectly entitled to substantial damages’.13 
 
Despite the developments in Jameel and Thornton effectively ending the 
possibility of a libel claim subsisting absent any proof of damage (whether 
evidential or inferential), it has remained commonplace to describe libel – 
unhelpfully – as actionable per se. Leading legal textbooks continue to do this.14 
Similarly, Tugendhat J appears not to have considered whether his conclusion 
on the seriousness threshold in Thornton, when combined with the Jameel 
ruling, had rendered libel no longer actionable per se. There is no mention in his 
judgment of any impact on libel’s actionability. Warby J, however, does 
acknowledge this effect of Thornton and Jameel in his High Court Lachaux 
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judgment when he states that “since Jameel it has no longer been accurate other 
than technically to describe libel as actionable without proof of any damage.”15 
But he could have phrased this in stronger terms. For, as we have seen, arguably 
since Jameel and certainly since Thornton, it has not been accurate even 
technically to describe libel as actionable per se. Indeed, it is the very technical 
detail of those essentially procedural decisions that has rendered libel a tort 
ultimately dependent upon proof of damage. 
 
THE MEANING OF S.1 DEFAMATION ACT 2013 
 
A. THE HIGH COURT JUDGMENT 
 
In the High Court, Warby J held that s.1 Defamation Act 2013 is “clearly more 
demanding” than the seriousness threshold identified in Thornton.16 The phrase 
“is likely to cause” in s.1 “should be read as ordinarily denoting more probable 
than not.”17 This is justified, he says, because that and similar phrases have been 
ordinarily held to mean that a balance of probabilities test is required. 
 
There appear to be three key reasons for the conclusion that s.1 requires this 
“more demanding” approach. First, the history of the Act’s passage through 
Parliament shows that the legislature settled on a requirement of “serious harm” 
only after considering both “substantial harm” and “serious and substantial 
harm”. Since Tugendhat J’s threshold formulation in Thornton requires only a 
tendency substantially to affect reputation adversely, rather than a tendency 
seriously to do so, Warby J sees this as an indication that Parliament intended to 
“raise the bar” beyond the Thornton position.18 The Explanatory Notes to the 
Act, which were cited in argument by the defendant and noted by Warby J, 
reinforce this impression, as do the Parliamentary statements made by the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Justice (albeit Warby J did not feel s.1 
disclosed an ambiguity that warranted the invocation of the rule in Pepper v 
Hart
19
). 
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 Lachaux (HC), (n 3) [60]. 
16
 Ibid [29]. 
17
 Ibid [34], citing Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2004] UKHL 44, [2005] 1 AC 253 [21]. 
18
 See further section B, below. 
19
 [1993] AC 593. 
Second, the use in the section of the phrases “has caused” and “is likely to 
cause” differ significantly from the Thornton formulation. If Parliament had 
intended to preserve the Thornton approach, Warby J tells us, it could have 
adopted the Thornton terminology; Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum 
and must be taken to have knowledge of the common law governing the field in 
which it is legislating. In choosing to depart from that terminology, Warby J 
finds Parliament to have intended to alter – and not merely replicate – the 
Thornton position.  
 
Moreover, Warby J finds that the combined effect of the Thornton and Jameel 
rules was to create a complex process whereby circumstantial facts are relevant 
only after the initial question of whether the words alone are capable of bearing 
a defamatory meaning has already been answered. By s.1, he insists, Parliament 
has legislated to simplify this arrangement, by “subsuming all or most of the 
Jameel jurisdiction into a new and stiffer statutory test requiring consideration 
of actual harm.”20 
 
Third, notwithstanding the second point, Warby J does not believe that 
attributing this intention to Parliament results in imputing an intention to alter 
the common law radically. Indeed, he labelled defence counsel’s suggestion that 
he would be imputing an intention to engage in a radical reworking of the law 
“alarmist and ill-founded”.21 This conclusion is worth scrutinising in detail 
before we turn to the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
 
Warby J holds that proof of damage, or of a likelihood that damage will occur, 
is required in order to satisfy s.1. He states that claimant counsel’s suggestion 
that this entailed a radical reworking of the law (no evidence of an intention to 
engage in which, she argued, could be found in s.1) is based on a “false 
premise”.22 The reason that it is “false” to suggest that his ruling means it will in 
all cases be necessary to adduce evidence to satisfy s.1, Warby J insists, is that it 
is still possible to make out a case in defamation by way of inference. He gives 
the example of a public figure accused in a national media publication of a 
“grave imputation” – a serious homicide or sexual crime.23 Such a figure, he 
tells us,  
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 Lachaux (HC), (n 3) [50]. 
21
 Ibid [56]. 
22
 Ibid [57]. 
23
 Ibid. 
 could hardly be required to call witnesses who read the words to 
say they thought the worse of the claimant in order to establish a 
claim. In such a case the common law rules for the objective 
assessment of the meaning and defamatory tendency of words are 
plainly unaffected, as is the single meaning rule.
24
  
 
The inference in such a case would arise from “the gravity of the imputation and 
the extent and nature of its readership or audience.”25 He contrasts this example 
with “less obvious cases”, in which “it may be necessary for a claimant to prove 
some facts beyond the words themselves and the fact and extent of their 
publication.”26 The rules, Warby J says, should not be any different as between 
the more and less obvious examples of defamation. By effectively eliding the 
Thornton and Jameel rules and combining them in a single, statutory test, s.1 
ensures that more and less obvious cases are treated in the same fashion. 
 
But if the rules are indeed to be uniform, the implication of this is that all 
claimants will need to adduce evidence to demonstrate – at the very least – the 
“nature and extent of [the statement’s] readership or audience.”27 This is a 
necessary implication of Warby J’s conclusion that the standard to which the 
claimant must prove the likelihood of serious harm is “more probable than not.” 
Thus when Warby J suggests the claimant’s arguments on this point are based 
on a “false premise”, he appears to overstate matters. For, by his own 
admission, evidence as to the “extent and nature” of publication will be needed 
in all cases. He might have justified this by saying that it goes no further than 
the combined effect of Thornton and Jameel, but that would undermine his 
assertion that Parliament intended to “raise the bar” in s.1. Thus, Warby J finds 
himself somewhat (though not fatally) hampered by a tension between his belief 
that Parliament has intended to “raise the bar” and claimant counsel’s argument 
that this entails imputing to Parliament an intention to engage in radical reform 
of the common law in a statutory provision that does not make this explicit. 
 
In order to deal with this tension, Warby J adopts a different line of justification 
for his interpretation of s.1 (a line that is not obviously commensurate with that 
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which precedes it). For he states, just two paragraphs later, that “my 
construction of s 1(1) means that libel is no longer actionable without proof of 
damage, and that the legal presumption of damage will cease to play any 
significant role.”28 At this point, he rejects both the suggestions that this entails 
radical reform and that Parliament has not expressly stated its intention to act 
radically. “These … are necessary consequences of … the natural and ordinary, 
indeed the obvious meaning of s 1(1).”29 Warby J thus concluded 
 
that by s 1(1) Parliament intended to and did provide that a 
statement is not defamatory of a person unless it has caused or will 
probably cause serious harm to that person’s reputation, these being 
matters that must be proved by the claimant on the balance of 
probabilities.
30
 
 
B. THE COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT 
 
The leading judgment in the Court of Appeal is given by Davis LJ. Rejecting 
Warby J’s interpretation of s.1, he finds (with Sharpe and McFarlane LJJ 
agreeing with him) that s.1 does not require the claimant to adduce evidence of 
reputational harm and that libel thus remains, as it has long been thought to be, 
actionable per se. 
 
Davis LJ agrees with Warby J that Parliament intended, in passing s.1, to “raise 
the bar” above the threshold set in Thornton and the strike out rule in Jameel.31 
There was a “clear” intention to “weed out … trivial claims.”32 Moreover, the 
term “serious”, used in s.1, “conveys something rather more weighty” than 
Thornton’s term, “substantial”.33 In Davis LJ’s view, however, it is not clear 
that Parliament has succeeded in achieving its aim by the wording used in s.1. 
 
The use of the phrase “is likely to” in s.1 (in respect of causing serious harm) 
gives Davis LJ some trouble. He admits to being initially attracted to the notion 
that “is likely to” conveys “something rather stronger” than “a tendency to 
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 Lachaux (CA), (n 1) [36]. 
32
 Ibid [43]. 
33
 Ibid [44]. 
cause” (the phrase used in Thornton).34 But he then finds himself wondering 
whether there will be much in the way of a difference – in practical terms – 
between a “tendency to cause” and a likelihood of causing.35 Having sown the 
seeds of doubt in his mind, Davis LJ then points out that the phrase “is likely 
to” does not have a settled meaning in all statutory contexts; it is not 
consistently held to mean “more likely than not” in the sense of a balance of 
probabilities test. Indeed, quoting from the Cream Holdings case – that Warby J 
had regarded as settling the question of the meaning of this phrase – Davis LJ 
recalls that Lord Nicholls said explicitly that “… “likely” in s.12(3) [of the 
Human Rights Act 1998] cannot have been intended to mean “more likely than 
not” in all situations.”36 Indeed, “its meaning depends upon the context in which 
it is used.”37 
 
Davis LJ does not agree with Warby J that “likely to cause” unequivocally bears 
the meaning of “more likely than not” in the context of s.1. Whereas Warby J 
had held that, if Parliament had intended the phrase to mean something other 
than that it could have – and would have – said so expressly, Davis LJ insists 
that, since Parliament is taken to be aware of existing common law doctrine, it 
must be aware of the judgment in Cream Holdings. Moreover, following the 
Cream Holdings guidance, the “context” within which the meaning of the word 
“likely” must be interpreted is, Davis LJ tells us, the law of defamation. And in 
defamation cases, the terms “likelihood” and “tendency” have, historically, been 
used essentially interchangeably.
38
 Given that Parliament must be taken to be 
aware, therefore, that the term “likely” is generally used interchangeably with 
the term “tendency” in defamation, in the absence of any express language 
indicating an intention to give “likely to cause” a different meaning, s.1 must be 
interpreted as imposing no more stringent a requirement than the common law 
previously imposed. 
 
Two further matters arising from Warby J’s judgment concerned Davis LJ. 
First, the fact that Warby J’s interpretation “effectively removes the 
presumption of damage which heretofore had always been a concomitant of the 
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 Ibid [46]. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid, quoting from Cream Holdings Limited v Banerjee [2004] UKHL 44, [2005] 1 AC 253, [20] (Lord 
Nicholls). 
37
 Cream Holdings, ibid, [12]. 
38
 Lachaux (CA), (n 1) [49]. Davis LJ cites, as examples, Thornton at [93], Berkoff v Burchill [1996] EWCA Civ 
564, [1996] 4 All ER 1008, and Andre v Price [2010] EWHC 2572 (QB). 
tort” particularly troubled him.39 He sees this as attributing to Parliament an 
intention to engage in more radical alteration of the law than can be found in the 
text of s.1: 
 
The actual language of s.1(1) does not compel a conclusion that the 
presumption of damage is intended to be abolished: and elsewhere 
the 2013 Act makes it specific where an aspect of the common law 
is intended to be abolished.
40
 
 
At one point in the judgment, Davis LJ remarks that “it can be important to 
distinguish the harm caused to reputation by the publication of falsehoods from 
the consequences that may flow therefrom.”41 By this, he appears to be 
communicating some misgivings about requiring claimants to adduce evidence 
of actual damage, as opposed to establishing a likelihood of reputational harm 
occurring solely by drawing inferences from the severity of the offending 
words. Davis LJ clearly sees this remark as an important step in his argument 
that s.1 does not have the effect of preventing libel being actionable per se.  
 
As we have seen, even prior to the Act, libel was no longer actionable per se in 
a technical sense. For requiring a claimant to demonstrate that an inference as to 
the likelihood for reputational harm may be drawn from the severity of the 
words used is a requirement to adduce some “proof” of this expected damage. In 
other words, drawing an inference is not a way of establishing a claim without 
any proof of damage. It is, rather, a way of providing some proof of damage 
(albeit not rising to the level of evidence of the nature and extent of publication 
that is, according to Warby J, now required by the Act). But Davis LJ does not 
seem to see it that way. And because he sees Warby J’s judgment as eliminating 
the possibility to establish a claim without any proof of damage, he sees the 
High Court’s interpretation as a radical one.  
 
Second, Warby J’s interpretation would lead to a situation where, for the 
purposes of determining the limitation period (which in defamation is one year 
from the date the cause of action accrues), claimants are left with no clear idea 
of when time starts to run. Under the traditional approach, the limitation period 
begins when the offending statement is published. But under Warby J’s 
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 Lachaux (CA), ibid, [58]. 
40
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41
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interpretation of s.1, the limitation period would begin only when serious harm 
occurs or a likelihood of serious harm (on a balance of probabilities) arises. This 
would lead to defamation becoming “creating some kind of ambient cause of 
action, drifting in and out of actionability”, which would not only be 
problematic on its own terms but would also put it at odds with other major 
torts.
42
 This point reinforces Davis LJ’s belief that such an alteration to the 
common law would be radical and that, in the absence of express wording in the 
section to that effect, Parliament cannot be taken to have intended such a 
significant reworking. 
 
WHAT’S IN A RIGHT? 
 
At base, the crux of the disagreement between the High Court and Court of 
Appeal in Lachaux is two differing views on the radicalness of the alteration to 
the common law position that Warby J’s approach to interpreting s.1 allows for. 
In simple terms, the two courts agree that Parliament does not intend radical 
changes in the absence of express wording to that effect. Where they disagree is 
on the issue of whether Warby J’s interpretation of s.1 amounts to radical 
change. For Warby J, the notion that s.1 makes libel actionable only upon proof 
of damage does not radically alter the position that the common law had found 
itself in by the time both the Jameel and Thornton rules had become routine 
parts of defamation method. For Davis LJ, this approach to s.1 did go further 
than the common law, and reversing the long-standing presumption of damage 
could only properly be regarded as a highly significant alteration.  
 
Both Warby J’s and Davis LJ’s conceptualisation of the relationship between 
the wrongful act and the harm suffered by the claimant follow what Eric 
Descheemaeker has termed a “unipolar” model.43 According to this model, 
wrongs and losses/harm are conflated. The harm suffered inheres in the 
commission of the wrongful act. In essence, both the wrong committed and the 
harm suffered are the diminution of the claimant’s right. Whilst both judgments 
adopt this basic model, the rights that they conceptualise within that model 
actually differ significantly from one another. 
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Warby J sees libel law as protecting nothing more or less than a right to 
reputation. It is, in his view, up to the claimant to demonstrate that his or her 
good reputation has been traduced. One’s reputation is traduced by a 
“defamatory” statement. By enacting s.1, Parliament has insisted that a 
defamatory statement is only one that causes, or is likely to cause, “serious 
harm”. Anything less is simply not defamatory. Thus, the claimant has more to 
prove than was once the case, but there is no necessary separation between the 
act of defaming a person and the causing of harm to that person. Indeed, the act 
of defaming constitutes – by definition – the causing of harm.  
 
Whilst Davis LJ also adopts a unipolar understanding, he conceptualises the 
claimant’s right differently. In his hands, the claimant’s right becomes one not 
merely to his or her good reputation, but a right to not have untrue things that 
have a tendency to lower his or her reputation in the estimation of others said 
about him or her publicly. The right as conceptualised by Davis LJ is thus 
significantly broader. Indeed, it harks back to a (pre-Human Rights Act) time 
when a claimant could successfully sue in libel where an untrue statement that 
would tend to lower him in the estimation of others was published but where, as 
a matter of fact, only nominal damage – if any – actually accrued to the 
claimant’s reputation.44 As Lord Phillips MR put it in Jameel, liability on this 
understanding simply “turns on the objective question of whether the 
publication is one which tends to injure the claimant’s reputation.”45 
 
Of course, Warby J insists that the time when such a claim could be brought at 
common law has long since passed. By contrast, it seems that Davis LJ’s 
interpretation of s.1 actually broadens the individual right at the heart of the tort 
of defamation, causing it to revert to a much earlier state. This is something that 
clearly goes against the intention of Parliament as expressed in the Explanatory 
Notes and ministerial statements in Parliament. With this in mind, it is worth 
considering the extent to which the High Court and Court of Appeal differ in 
their attentiveness to the contextual background within which Lachaux sits. 
 
ATTENTIVENESS TO CONTEXT 
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Attentiveness to the broader context within which a particular statutory 
provision sits is vital for the interpretation of that provision. Whilst the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Lachaux makes some of the right noises about context, it 
does not attend sufficiently intently to the state of the common law prior to the 
Act’s passage. This leads it to reach an interpretation of s.1 that is strangely at 
odds with its own analysis of Parliament’s intention. 
 
Both the High Court and Court of Appeal judgments invoke – in aid of their 
own preferred constructions – the idiom that Parliament, when legislating, must 
be taken to be aware of the existing common law in the field. However, the 
High Court attends closely to the formal intricacies of defamation in the 
common law, focusing intensely on the Jameel and Thornton rulings and on the 
interplay between the two. By contrast, the Court of Appeal takes a broad-brush 
view of the common law, dwelling on the long-accepted – but formally 
inaccurate, post-Jameel – notion that libel is actionable per se while eschewing 
relevant, technical details. Having (erroneously, at least in formal terms) 
decided that libel has always been actionable per se, the Court of Appeal 
concludes that an interpretation of s.1 that changes libel into a tort that requires 
proof of damage is too radical. Absent express wording, Parliament cannot, it 
holds, have intended such a radical change to the common law. But the change 
appears so radical only because the Court of Appeal did not attend sufficiently 
to the practical – and formal – reality of the pre-Act common law. 
 
Both courts acknowledge that Parliament did intend to “raise the bar” for 
claimants. But whilst the High Court judgment attributes significant weight to 
this aspect of s.1’s context, the Court of Appeal attributes it very little. As a 
result, the Court of Appeal judgment ends up in a rather bizarre tangle. For 
whilst it has identified a Parliamentary intention to “raise the bar” in s.1, its 
interpretation of s.1 does not amount to a raising of the bar at all. The Court of 
Appeal is not wrong to suggest that there may be circumstances in which a 
statutory provision is so poorly drafted that, despite a reasonably clear 
legislative intention, it cannot be given effect in such a way as to realise that 
intention. But s.1 is not so poorly drafted. This is apparent because the High 
Court arrived at an entirely formally acceptable interpretation that does give 
effect to the legislative intention identified. 
 
The Court of Appeal did succeed in attending to one contextual matter that the 
High Court did not address: the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure 
Rules (CPR). The Court of Appeal recalls that the purpose of the codified CPR 
is to streamline court proceedings and improve the efficiency of the civil justice 
system. Elsewhere in the Defamation Act 2013, moreover, Parliament had 
enacted measures designed to make defamation cases faster and less costly to 
deal with.
46
 Against this contextual background, the Court of Appeal finds the 
High Court’s interpretation of s.1 problematic. This is because requiring 
claimants to adduce evidence of reputational harm at the outset will 
undoubtedly increase the length and cost of proceedings (in Lachaux, the High 
Court scheduled a two-day hearing for this purpose). The Court of Appeal thus 
focuses more than the High Court does on the procedural implications of its 
ruling for future cases, as it also does when it considers the undesirability of 
uncertainty in knowing the date upon which a cause of action for libel will 
accrue (for limitation purposes). 
 
However, the Court of Appeal did not deal with the implications of its ruling for 
the existing Jameel doctrine. Whilst Thornton’s threshold has been subsumed 
into s.1, it is far from clear what the Court of Appeal thinks has become of 
Jameel. It has not been expressly overruled (indeed, the Court of Appeal, bound 
by its own decisions, cannot overrule it). But the Court of Appeal’s insistence 
that libel is – once again – actionable per se casts doubt on whether Jameel can 
still properly be used to strike out claims solely on the basis that insufficient 
reputational harm, or a likelihood thereof, can be evidenced. For to strike out a 
claim on that basis would mean – as the High Court acknowledged – that libel is 
in effect not actionable per se, which would conflict with the Court of Appeal’s 
ruling in Lachaux. 
 
There is one further, related contextual matter that, curiously, plays no role in 
either judgment, but which has clear relevance to the point about the future of 
Jameel in the light of the Court of Appeal’s decision. This is the context 
provided by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights that has, 
in recent years, declared that an individual’s reputation is part of the right to 
private and family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.
47
 Jameel 
recognised that refusing to strike out libel claims that did not amount to a “real 
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and substantial tort” could amount to a disproportionate interference with a 
defendant’s Article 10 right to freedom of expression (given particular statutory 
prominence, albeit with little practical impact, by s.12 Human Rights Act 1998). 
But Jameel was handed down before the ECtHR Grand Chamber ruling in 
Pfeifer confirmed the right to reputation as an aspect of Article 8 – a ruling that, 
formally, levels the playing field between claimant and defendant in 
defamation. An argument could be made, in an appropriate case, that striking 
out a case under the Jameel rule might disproportionately interfere with the 
claimant’s Article 8 rights. At the very least, the notion that Jameel was a 
necessary corrective to an earlier position at common law that paid insufficient 
attention to Article 10 interests can now be challenged, since “neither [Article 8 
nor 10] has as such precedence over the other.”48 This would not be a novel type 
of argument in defamation law; in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, Tugendhat J 
held that Lord Nicholls’ guidance on the Reynolds49 defence – that, all other 
matters being equal, the court should find in favour of publication – could no 
longer stand in the light of developments in the ECtHR.
50
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In Lachaux, the Court of Appeal has arrived at an interpretation of s.1 
Defamation Act 2013 that goes against the intention it attributes to Parliament 
in passing the provision. The Court has woven itself a thoroughly tangled web 
indeed. Yet this was entirely avoidable. Both the High Court’s and Court of 
Appeal’s respective interpretations of s.1 are defensible – each has valid reasons 
that can be mobilised in support of the claim that its interpretation is correct. 
But only the High Court’s decision is sufficiently attentive to the formal reality 
of the state that the common law had found itself in prior to the passing of the 
Act. As such, the High Court’s decision – whilst imperfect – attributes the more 
sensible meaning to the Act. 
 
As a result of the Court of Appeal’s decision, however, we are left with some 
clear but problematic guidance. Libel is actionable per se. A claimant need only 
prove that words complained-of have a tendency to cause serious reputational 
harm in order to found a cause of action. The cause of action will accrue on the 
date upon which publication of the offending statement takes place (and not, as 
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became a necessary corollary of the High Court’s decision, upon the date that a 
likelihood of serious harm arises). The upshot of this is that claimants in 
defamation now face a task that is no more arduous when bringing libel claims 
than they did prior to the Act, despite Parliament having intended the opposite 
result. And the right that they are able to protect thereby is one even broader 
than Parliament contemplated. It is a right that has not been seen in England 
since the Court of Appeal recognised in Jameel that it could lead to a 
disproportionate interference with Article 10 ECHR. It is a right not only to 
one’s good reputation, but to a freedom from criticism of a sort that would have 
a tendency to cause serious reputational harm – even if none ever actually 
occurs.  
